China Cozies Up To Kashmir

China’s conflict with the Indian sub-continent dates back to the Qing Dynasty when Manchu ruling forces set out to conquer Western lands in the Tibetan Plateau and Tarim Basin (present-day Xinjiang Autonomous Region). Han Chinese activity in the region goes back even further as evidence shows from the Shang Dynasty’s extensive use of Xinjiang jade. Jump forward to the1962 China/India war in the Tawang valley, and China is yet again carving away at the region, humiliatingly grabbing a section of Indian Kashmir. Today, add Pakistan into the mix and you get a boarder conflict governed by a dash of economic interests and a side of power politics.

China’s involvement in the Pakistani-governed region of Kashmir has amplified in the past year. China has proposed further investment in the region with its plan to extend road projects from the existing Karakoram highway, which spans across Xinjiang and Pakistan. China has shown its eagerness with a recent donation from the China Road and Bridge Corporation totaling just over 1 million RMB. The funds were given to Pakistan’s Prime Minister in order to help rebuild sections of highway damaged from the devastating floods that hit last July. This soft gesture no doubt has India concerned.

Last week India issued a statement saying they would no longer accept separate visa issued to Indian citizens from Jamma, Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh (refer to map). To this group, Chinese diplomats in India issue visas on a separate piece of paper stapled to the passport, rather than the standard pasted versions. This undoubtedly raises questions of sovereignty over the said regions.

China’s recent cozying up in Pakistan’s portion of Kashmir has India worried. Along with this, Beijing is furious at Arunachal Pradesh’s recent hosting of the Dalai Lama, especially since China has long considered the region a part of “south Tibet.” This has resulted in Chinese officials refusing to receive Indian leaders and ignoring Indian appeals for official discourse on the visa issue.

All in all, these territorial disputes could be construed as China’s desire to undermine India’s powerful position in the region, yet also could reflect a growing strategic economic partnership between China and Pakistan.

*Map courtesy of economist.com

“THE G-20: ALL FOR ONE OR SOME FOR ALL?”

On the 11th day of November 2010, South Korea will be hosting the G-2o summit in Seoul. The G-20 summit was created by ministers of the departments of finance of several countries and and central bank governors from 20 major economies, with the intent to “stabilize the international economy after the financial crisis of 2008.” Presidents and finance ministers from all over the 20 countries are expected to join together and will be discussing global economic issues.

As the host of the G-20 summit, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak proposed three major agendas. The first, is to create longer-lasting policies that could bring about fundamental solutions to other financial crises that might happen in the future. The second, is to create a sustainable international financial regulatory system. Lastly, but not least of all, is the aim to modernize international financial institutions that can protect countries unrelated to future financial crises from being susceptible. In my opinion, the IMF has done a sub-par job in solving the 2008 financial crisis and South Korea believes that major institutional changes are needed to make the IMF do the greatest good for the greatest number.

Looking at the three agendas, they have an implied meaning of what South Korea really desires and wishes to say: “We didn’t cause the crisis, the U.S. did. But, why did we suffer? Why do we have to take measures to insure ourselves from such crises by buying foreign currency? Do we need create a global regulatory system that could suppress unrestricted expansion of credit markets?”

The G-20 is not about a meeting of representatives from the selected 20 countries to “collaborate together to devise policies and to stabilize global economy.” It is a Roman Colosseum of 20 different gladiators fighting each other for survival. Well, it is kind of different now. We fight with brains rather than with swords and shields, and for economic prosperity rather than survival. Countries with higher power have a greater voice in the meeting. Countries with lower economic power acquiesce to the agreements made by their stronger “peers.” The G20, then, falls into self-contradiction. Initially meant to “foster international collaboration,” and to “represent global needs,” the G20 is rather an arena of competition of persuasion skills, with a slight edge given to the relatively more powerful, representing no one but the member nations themselves.

Will There Be A War of North Korean Succession?

There is a little kingdom in the East, where the leader rules with iron fist and firm absolutism, deeply rooted into the mind of the people. Absolutism is nothing like a method of ruling in this little kingdom; it is indeed the religion, the way of life, the truth, and the source of life. Under the name of self-reliance, this kingdom has largely been cut off from the other parts of the world until 1990. This kingdom believes in the religion of Juche-ism and militarism. This kingdom, one of the most ironic nation-states of all time, is North Korea. Although absolutism in North Korea is at the level of religion, with its aging ruler, Kim Jong-il, multiple possible successors are throwing their hats into the ring.

Various sources have said that Kim Jong-eun, one of Kim Jong-il’s sons, would succeed Kim Jong-il, and this claim has been more or less confirmed by increased publicity for Kim Jong-eun. For example, a large-scale firework on Kim Il-sung’s birthday was accredited to Kim Jong-eun. In addition, Kim Jong-eun was sighted multiple times with Kim Jong-il in some of his overseeing trips to military units and factories. It is also heard that the military, probably the most important factor in deciding the successor, is supporting Kim Jong-eun. However, recent news about North Korean power structure also tells an interesting story. One of Kim Jong-il’s most trusted advisors is his sister’s husband, Jang Seong-taek. Kim Jong-il’s trust in his sister is exceptional. Although Kim Jong-il has sacked Jang, too, but that can be understood as his method of controlling his subjects: sacking and calling back again in order to ensure loyalty and fear. That Jang might be coming into the game of succession. Jang, having served Kim Jong-il for a long time, also has enormous influence inside North Korean politics, probably more than Kim Jong-eun, who stayed outside the country for the most of his education, has.

Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-eun are quite different. Kim Jong-il was deliberately trained to succeed the throne from the 70s, and Kim Il-sung meticulously prepared his son for the job by letting him gain enough experience in various fields. Kim Jong-eun never had that kind of luxury. His youth is his strength, but it may not look so attractive to other old leaders of North Korea. In contrast, Jang, although aged, has a lot of experience and Kim Jong-il’s trust. Kim Jong-il may change his mind, or Jang’s allies might overturn Kim Jong-il’s decision after his death (unlike Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il does not have his godly characteristics; hence, it is easier for people to overturn his decisions). Internal struggle that can rival the one that North Korea went through right after the Korean War might take place. Moreover, any struggle will not just end inside the country. Immense interest China has in North Korea is no secret; South Korea’s desire to reunify is not even necessary to be mentioned; Japan’s interest to stop or at least slow down China’s growth and desire to eliminate dangerous North Korean missiles would mean that Japan would be desperately trying to have some say in the future of North Korea; Russia and the United States would also get involved, whether voluntarily or not, since North Korea issue seriously affects their national securities. Armed conflict is not out of calculation.

Violence is probably less likely; more likely, Jang and Kim Jong-eun would strike a deal to divide the power between the two, that is, if Jang actually decides to go against Kim Jong-il’s heir, possibly putting Kim Jong-eun in a nominally higher position. Important stuff is the events that would take place after the succession. In a society such as North Korea where absolute power has taken place for a long time, it might be bit of a shock to the populous when their leader, presumably invincible and whatnot, dies. This is exactly why Kim Jong-il pulled off his policy of propaganda saying he is following the legacy of Kim Il-sung. Will the same trick work on North Koreans this time? Maybe not. Same trick wears off after time, and sources have repeatedly reported that North Koreans are showing resentment toward Kim’s regime. Hence, Kim Jong-eun’s regime would probably rely on fear and external threat (whether made up or real) rather than reverence from the people in order to retain the status and power. External threat is plenty in the turbulent situation in Northeastern Asia. Traditional internal control through exaggerated self-importance and external threat will not only continue but also increase and become extreme over time.

Jang is currently not showing any sign of opposition against Kim Jong-eun. Things will get onto overdrive after Kim Jong-il dies. There are many possibilities: Jang, opposition from the part of the military, Kim Jong-nam (who has close ties to Chinese government officials and openly showed his opposition to succession), and external factors. The situation might be resolved peacefully, but this is a bomb that can go off any time. The box of Pandora is waiting to be opened in a matter of time. The seriousness of this revelation is nothing superficial; countries, policymakers, and peoples should better get ready to respond to every possible scenario that might take place.

Censorship in China: Will the Great Firewall Stand Forever?

Censorship in China has frequently been a topic of global media discussion, especially on October 11 when 23 party veterans, journalists, and academics criticized the government’s control on the media in an open letter. The impetus of this activism was the Central Propaganda Department’s online and offline censoring of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao himself. In an interview with Fareed Zakaria on September 23, Wen called for reform, saying “the people’s wishes for and needs for democracy and freedom are irresistible.” Though this event may have been the immediate cause, Chinese censorship both offline and online has been present since long before.

Since 1994, when Chinese leaders chose to open access to the internet, the Chinese Communist Party has felt increasingly threatened by the new tool, first struggling against commercial online journalism threatening the state’s news and information monopoly. Though the Party successfully minimized this potential challenge to its control, between 1999 and 2004, bulletin-board systems and blogs shaped alternative channels of communication became new threats that also had to be controlled. Started 2004, a general media crackdown has been in place as the government has tried to restrict SMS texting, blogging, microblogging, and other new ways to spread opinions. To achieve this restriction, the state has invested billions of dollars into technology and employees. The general Internet censorship of China has been dubbed “the great firewall.”

The idea of the Chinese government censoring and limiting websites available to the citizens is particularly troubling considering that China is the world’s largest internet population with about 420 million users, a number expected to increase rapidly. This fact makes Chinese censorship globally important as it promotes self-censorship outside of its boundaries. Just as the music industry censors musicians so that stores such as Wal-Mart will sell their records, it is possible that commercial websites will avoid expressing anything that the Chinese government might find objectionable to avoid being shut out of such a large and growing market.

The self-censorship issue may not be as pressing as it seems, because the Party’s control over the Internet is far from absolute. The Chinese people have found new ways to search for and express alternative ideas and in some cases mobilize public support. Citizen journalism, peer-to-peer networks, and information sharing have all worked to help increase liberty available to Chinese citizens. It is widely accepted that the Communist Party will be unable to maintain its information monopoly as long as the Internet is available to its citizens, which raises the question of whether the Chinese government will shut down the entire Internet infrastructure in their country rather than face the alternative.

That eventuality seems extremely unlikely because the usefulness and potential profitability of widespread Internet access to the country is huge compared to the dangers that the country would face by giving up their information monopoly. Even if people in China had unlimited internet access, the worst that would likely happen from the people being able to see and express unflattering facts and negative opinions regarding the Party would be increased protests and civil unrest, which China most likely would have little trouble dealing with. Other citizens may even become more passionately supportive of the Party as a reaction to hearing it insulted. It’s true that having to suppress more civil disobedience would cause China to be viewed negatively by the international community, but shutting down the Internet would certainly do the same thing. In fact, the cost of maintaining the great firewall and constantly trying to keep up with new ways around it may already be greater to China than dealing with the increased civil disobedience that an uncensored internet might bring about. If the leaders of China eventually come to the same belief, they may decide to reduce their efforts to censor the Internet or abandon them altogether. After all, there are already Chinese Party members such as Wen who believe that that the push for freedom is irresistible. If more Party leaders come to believe the same thing, they’ll probably stop resisting.

Hu’s the President of China. Xi’s the (next) President of China?

On October 18, 2010 Xi Jingping, who already held positions as the Vice President of the People’s Republic of China and Principal of the Central Party School, was appointed to be the Vice-Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission. China-watchers interpret this move as cementing the Xi’s status as China’s leader-in-waiting. Current CCP general secretary and President, Hu Jintao, was appointed to the same senior military post three years before he took over at the paramount leader of China in 2002. The Economist reports, “This adds little to Mr Xi’s power (the armed forces will remain under Mr Hu and his generals). But it clearly signals that the party believes that Mr Xi should replace Mr Hu as general secretary in late 2012.”

Leadership transition has been a contentious issue in Chinese politics since the death of Mao, the first successful transition happened in when Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin. The CCP is looking to replicate when current generation of leaders, the so called-fourth generation, retires. According to Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese leadership politics at the Brookings Institution, “The 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 will select a new Politburo and Standing Committee. The members of these two supreme leadership bodies will concurrently occupy the top positions of all other important Party, government, and military organizations.

So who is Xi Jinping? Xi is a “princeling”, his father, Xi Zhongxun, a revolutionary guerrilla commander who served as deputy prime minister under Mao and who later supported Hu Jintao’s rise through the CCP ranks and shepherded the spectacular success of Shenzhen. However, far from riding on the laurels of his father’s success, Xi Jinping has forged a distinguished career in the CCP. Xi was responsible for the successful execution of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Prior to his promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee, Xi served as the party chief of Zhejiang province and of Shanghai.

His reputation as a liberal reformer and his tough stance on corruption makes Xi an appealing candidate to domestic and international audiences. According to Cheng Li “Xi has leadership experience in economic administration and favors pro-market reforms. In the provinces that he ran, Xi was particularly noted for his promotion of the private sector. His likely policy priorities lie in enhancing economic efficiency and promoting market liberalization, continuing China's high rates of GDP growth, and expanding China's integration into the world economy.” Former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yue said of Xi: "I would put him in the Nelson Mandela class of persons. A person with enormous emotional stability who does not allow his personal misfortunes or sufferings affect his judgment. In other words, he is impressive." Yet despite these testimonials relatively little about Xi’s policy orientation is known, like Hu before him, Xi has kept a low public profile and rarely speaks to reporters. So China watchers will be scrutinizing Xi intensely over the next two years to discern the direction he will steer China in 2012.

Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford (FACES)

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Event Digest for 10/18/10 to 10/24/10

Monday October 18

Writing Sex and Politics in Chinese in Taiwan - with Author Ang Li

3:00pm
Room 240 Franklin Center, Central Campus

Wednesday October 20

Japanese and American Scientific Management: The Construction of Korean Labor in Younghill Kang's East Goes West - with Professor David Roh

3:00pm
Friedl 225, East Campus

Thursday October 21

Cine-East: East Asian Film Series - 1428
7:00 pm
Richard White Lecture Hall, East Campus

Saturday October 24

Challenges in the Sino-American Relationship - with Robert O'Brien, FACES

2:00pm

Perkins 217, West Campus

Event Digest for 10/04/10 to 10/11/10

Monday October 3

More Sons to Give: Individual, Village, and Nation during the Russo-Japanese War - with Professor Simon Partner

12:00pm
Carr 299, East Campus

Tuesday October 4

Cine-East: East Asian Film Series - The Ants
8:00 pm
Richard White Lecture Hall, East Campus